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ABSTRACT 
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to increase China´s integration with the world economy 
through infrastructure projects and investment. We want to assess whether the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) has contributed to increase Chinese trade with Sub-Saharan Africa. While the 
literature has covered the trade effects of the BRI, most of the studies try to measure the gains 
of trade derived from decreased transportation costs. While this remains as one of the most 
important features of the BRI, we wanted to measure how countries receiving BRI related 
investments trade with China. To achieve this goal, we built a Gravity model of trade for Chinese 
exports to 16 Sub-Saharan countries. If BRI investments are effective, China should trade more 
with these countries.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China´s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sparked the interest of journalists, analysts and 
policymakers. It has become the symbol of China´s future ambitions of leading the world's 
economic and political spheres and one of the policies that makes the United States´ leadership 
to be questioned by the international community. The BRI is seen by many as a megalomaniac 
plan to gain control of developing economies in order to provide a solution to China´s economic 
overcapacity problem and provide with the resources China needs to fuel its transition into a 
consumer economy. Africa specifically has been one of the main targets of the BRI for this 
reason. Since these economies do not have the financial strength to undertake much needed 
massive infrastructure projects by themselves, Chinese investments from Exim Bank or the 
AIIB linked with the BRI have come to save the day. However, these countries may face 
difficulties paying back, which has raised concerns over China´s growing political interests in 
the region. In addition, the strong presence of Chinese workers and officials in the region has 
triggered discontent over the local population. Zambia, for example, has seen how Chinese 
presence has become a part of their political discussion, with clashes and demonstrations around 
the issue becoming more pervasive. All this comes to show how a policy to foster growth and 
trade can have such a profound effect on a country´s economic and political reality.  
Our study intends to find out how trade between China and Africa works and to observe the 
effects of BRI membership and related investments on bilateral trade. To this end, the literature 
directed us towards building a Gravity model on Chinese exports to 16 African economies, for 
which, we built our own panel data set. Section 2 describes the BRI and its particularities in 
Africa. Section 3 analyses the existing political and economic connections between the two 
regions, going into foreign policy, bilateral trade and investments. Section 4 describes the 
methods and materials used to analyse bilateral trade for our specific case, based on a literature 
review on current studies about the BRI and China-Africa trade, to then present the Gravity 
model and describing the data sample. Section 5 lays out the expected results to be obtained 
from our empirical model. Then we develop the methodology used to obtain our regression 
model and present the results for each variable. Finally, Section 6 provides the conclusions 
drawn from our study. 
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2. THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
2.1. A worldwide project 
Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the creation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 
September 2013 during a speech in Kazakhstan. The program, aimed to increase economic ties 
between Eurasian countries, which also reaches Africa, is said to be the rebirth of the Silk Road, 
the ancient trade route that connected China with Europe through a series of trading posts and 
roads that made the exchange of goods at a transcontinental level possible.  
 
The project aims to increase the economic ties of all the countries between Europe and China 
through economic development policies, increased connectivity via infrastructure investment, 
lower trade barriers, capital flows and worker mobility. The project is divided into two parallel 
strands, the Silk Road Economic Belt, dealing with roads, railroads and drydocks, and the 
Maritime Silk and Road, revolving around sea connectivity. (MFAPRC, 2017) 
The Belt and Road initiative spans 65 countries, home to more than 60% of the World´s 
population, which account to 75% of global GDP and hold up to 75% of total energy resources. 
Since 2015, when the Initiative was made official, 900 infrastructure projects have been initiated, 
valued at around $1 trillion in total, and has prompted talks to enter free trade agreements with 
25 BRI countries. (World Bank, 2019) 
China aims to shift its economy through the BRI. For one, China´s growth up to very recently 
has largely come from exports, which have originated from labour intensive industries, 
strengthened by heavy state-sponsored investment in its earlier stages and later by in-bound 
Foreign Direct Investment. Then, China wants to transform its economy into a services and 
technology economy, with consumption-led growth.  The BRI aims to decrease China´s 
overcapacity problem by increasing its exports to the rest of the world through the improvement 
of infrastructure overseas. This would allow for more trade through under-connected regions, 
like Central Asia or Africa, and increasing the capacity of currently existing sea routes. This 
would also help the ailing Chinese underdeveloped regions -namely, Xinjiang and Yunnan- to 
grow faster by linking them China´s more industrialized regions and the rest of the World and 
to foster the use of the Chinese currency abroad. (Passi, 2019) 
The unveiling of the BRI responds to a shift in Chinese foreign policy, which can be traced back 
to Chairman Hu Jintao (2002-2012). The increased accumulation of economic and political 
power brought by China´s remarkable economic growth, prompted its leaders to engage in 
multilateral regional talks and to develop their own brand of foreign policy initiatives. Xi Jinping 
continued with their predecessors´ habits and has integrated China in regional cooperation 
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agreements like ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) or the GMS (Greater 
Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation), which serve the goals of supporting the BRI by 
fostering infrastructure investment and economic cooperation and to maintain friendly relations 
with China´s closest neighbours. (Yu, 2016) 
China also created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund in 2013 
in order to provide credit to finance BRI related infrastructure projects in Asia. Some 
commentators argue that this institution may be used to gain political leverage against 
developing countries, which are in need of investments. However, more than 60 countries have 
joined the AIIB, including the UK, Australia or South Korea, so it might be difficult to argue 
that China is going to favour some countries while excluding other members (Dollar, 2015). 
Institutions with longer standing in Chinese financing of projects abroad like the China 
Development Bank or the already mentioned EXIM still cover most of the financing needs of 
the BRI. Another objective pursued with these institutions is to Challenge the dominance of 
Western supranational institutions like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank. These 
banks have financed projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Melaka Gateway 
Port to name a few. (Cai, 2018) 
2.2. The Belt and Road Initiative in Africa   
The increasing understanding between China and African countries has been materialised in the 
inclusion of Africa into the Belt and Road Initiative. During the Belt and Road Forum, held in 
Beijing in 2017 to sign economic and trade cooperation agreements with over 30 countries, 
Kenya and Ethiopia among them. These countries plus Egypt and South Africa have signed 
Memorandums of Understanding with China and all of them are either members or prospective 
members of the Chinese led AIIB, although the bulk of the financing is carried out by Exim 
Bank. The BRI projects in Africa play the role of strengthen the Maritime Silk Road, connecting 
the route that from Pakistan and South-East China with the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez 
Canal. The BRI´s next operational objective in Africa is to connect the East and the West Coast 
through a network of rails and roads that would link Tanzania with Angola. (Breuer, 2017) 
- Suez Canal corridor:  
China has become the major contributor to the development of the Suez Canal 
Corridor. The project is reinforced with an improvement of Egypt´s railroad network 
and an expansion of the Alexandria Port, all conducted by Chinese Firms. Since Egypt´s 
role in the Maritime Silk Road is so crucial, China has made sure to have Egypt on their 
side by funding Egypt´s Central Bank and providing loans to the National Bank of 
Egypt. (The Diplomat, 2016) 
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- Ethio-Djibouti Railway:  
A railroad line is being built between Addis-Ababa and the Chinese built Red Sea Port 
(Doraleh) in Djibouti, with EXIM providing up to 70% of the funds needed for 
construction. China wants to give Ethiopia, a resource-rich country with solid 
production capabilities, an exit to the sea. The plan includes connecting these countries 
with the Kenyan port of Mombasa, which is also going to be connected via railway with 
inland countries like South Sudan, Uganda or Rwanda. (DLAPIPER, 2018). There are 
also plans in place to connect the aforementioned rail network with the Western African 
Coast (Daily China, 2016) 
- TanZam Line:  
China wants to revive the TanZam line, a project developed with the help of Chinese 
aid during the 70s that linked Tanzania with Zambia to give Zambia´s copper an exit to 
the sea. This line is projected to be connected with the Lobito-Luau line (Angola), which 
was finished in 2014 and was built by China Railway Construction aiming to connect 
the mineral-rich interior with the coast (Global Construction Review, 2014). This 
project is a showcase of the duplicity of the BRI. While it serves a much-needed 
infrastructure gap, it is still focused on the extraction of resources from impoverished 
countries desperate for money.  
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Figure 1. Breuer, J. (2017). One Belt, One Road? The role of Africa in Chinas’s Belt & Road initiative, page 3. 
BRI projects have raised eyebrows in the international community due to the vulnerability of 
some recipient countries. By 2017, 23 out of 68 BRI recipient countries were identified in a 
potential debt-distress situation due to the financing of BRI projects. Among them were 
Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia and Kenya. Since China does not fully adhere to any international 
credit standard, their policy on countries which are not paying back can be unpredictable. While 
there is ample evidence that China usually agrees to either forgive or restructure-partially or 
totally- the debts of struggling countries, the fears of Chinese handling of debts comes from 
cases like Sri Lanka. This country incurred in debt with China to build the Hambantota Port but 
was unable to service the debt, so Chinese authorities proposed a debt-for-equity swap with a 
99-year lease to manage the port by themselves. (Hurley et al, 2018) 
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3. CHINESE TIES TO AFRICA 
3.1. From Mao to Xi 
We can identify three stages in Chinese involvement in China. Prior to the 1980s, China´s 
relation with Africa was largely ideological, and was centred in fostering political and military 
ties with countries opposing the Western bloc, while pursuing Chinese interests in the continent 
contrary to the Soviet Union, which was mainly achieved through development aid. This process 
came to a halt during the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping took the reins of the Republic of 
China and took a major policy shift towards economic development and modernisation. This 
approach, which had an emphasis on investment and trade relations, was contrary to the 
previous and defined Chinese foreign policy, as proved by its increasing ties with Japan and the 
United States. When we combine this approach with the so called “lost decade”, a time of unrest 
and stagnation in the African continent, economic relations between the regions did not make 
sense any more, and thus, trade figures decreased quite remarkably while aid followed suit. 
(Taylor, 1998) 
This situation came to a halt when the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989 made Western leaders 
uncomfortable with investment and trade with China, and made threats to cut future economic 
ties conditional on the PRC´s human rights record. Meanwhile, some African leaders sent 
outspoken support for the way China crushed dissent, which provides an example of how the 
two regions would grow to like each other in a political sense. This support came over African 
leader´s anxiety over Western pressures to democratize their governments, resentment from the 
neo-colonial powers and the intention to jump-start the weak economic ties between the 
regions. To China, Africa became a source of diversification of their political and economic 
interests. If relations with the West had gone sour, at face value at least, China was able then to 
find new partners with which it could gain leverage in the international scene -as witnessed by 
some African countries´ support of Chinese interests in the United Nations-, and new 
destinations for their exports.  (Taylor, 1998)  
Non-interference in domestic affairs play a key role in defining both China and Africa´s foreign 
policy, as both regions have been heavily influenced by the intervention of Western imperialist 
powers in the past, and thus, both are wary of other countries meddling in internal affairs. This 
is further exemplified by China´s Five Principles for Peaceful Co-existence, which have shaped 
Chinese foreign policy since the 1950s (Kerry, 2017). However, these principles seem to be 
currently invoked just when human rights, authoritarianism or corruption are brought up by 
Western powers (Taylor, 2006). 
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But China had further motivations for expanding its influence over Africa. One of the goals 
behind the rhetoric was to obtain oil supplies from oil-rich African countries in order to satisfy 
Chinese demand for energy to fuel its economic growth. For one China does not have the 
domestic capacity to rely on itself for its energy needs. In a year like 2004, oil use grew by 15% 
while domestic oil production just increased by a 2%. Second, China does not want to rely on 
the world´s oil market, it decided to reach African countries where Western oil interests were 
not as important as elsewhere, thus obtaining an upper hand over foreign competitors, in a 
finders-are-keepers manner. This expansion has been characterized by State Owned 
Enterprises, like CNOOC, CNPC or Sinopec conducting a vertical integration strategy by 
setting up assets in African countries and controlling its transport and focusing in China´s long 
term interests. Just in the early 2000s, said companies made multi-billion oil deals, ranging from 
prospection and barrel supplies to building refineries and pipes in countries like Angola, Nigeria, 
Kenya, Ivory Coast, Sudan or Ethiopia. (Taylor, 2006). 
3.2. Trade and Resources 
Chinese relations with Africa have changed over the last 2 decades. The economic ties of the 
two regions has increased during the last decades due to China´s role as an investor and an 
infrastructure provider. As per capita income has risen in both regions Africa has become a 
market for Chinese Exports and investments, which overtook aid flows in the latest decades. 
This evidences that Chinese relations with Africa are commercially motivated, as aid was only 
an important flow between the regions since the Cold War era (Wang, 2007).  As we can observe 
in Figure 1, trade flows between China and Africa have increased notably over the last 2 decades. 
 
Figure 2. Johns-Hopkins University (2019). China-Africa Research Initiative. Data: China-Africa 
Trade. 
 
If we observe the product mix of trade between China and Africa in Figure 1 and 2, we can 
observe a shift since the year 2000 up to 2017. China started the century exporting more than a 
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45% of consumer goods, followed in importance by intermediate goods and textiles, to the Sub-
Saharan region. By 2017, the exports of consumer and intermediate goods showed a decreasing 
trend. Meanwhile, we can observe an increasing trend in exports of capital goods and machinery 
and electrical components, which were then the next most important exports after consumer 
goods. We can conclude that consumable goods had decreased in importance when compared 
to Capital goods. Increasing exports of capital goods and machinery should have a positive 
impact on African economies, which are in need for technology to improve their productive 
capabilities and get a foot into the initial stages of industrialization, as African economies 
currently rely on resources extraction and agriculture for their subsistence. However, studies on 
the impact of import-led Growth of African Economies seem to suggest that there is no such 
relation, which could be attributed to the inability of African economies to use imported 
technologies to improve their manufacturing capabilities and the bad praxis on procurement 
contracts caused by corruption (Ogbonna, 2011). 
 
Figure 1-Source: WITS. China Product Export Product Share to Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Figure 2- WITS: China Product Import Product Share to Sub-Saharan Africa.  
On the Import side, China´s main imports from the region are raw materials and fuels, both of 
which have decreased in the period considered. We can observe that the next most important 
goods are raw materials too (wood and minerals). The importance of fuels is of such magnitude 
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that 5 African Oil exporting countries account for 85% of Chinese imports from the region 
(Broadman, 2007) From this, we can extract that raw materials are an essential part of trade 
between the regions. Jenkins and Edwards (2005) predicted that higher per capita income in 
China would increase food and clothing imports from Africa, but that has not happened, as 
these categories´ import share are far below the rest as China´s interest on the region lies on 
natural resources, which are used as inputs for both their industries and their consumers.  
There is evidence that Chinese exports to Sub-Saharan Africa are hurting local export 
capabilities. Increases of Chinese exports to the region have been linked with lower levels of 
local exports. The sectors most affected by the crowding-out effect have been textiles, 
machinery and equipment. This effect has even displaced chemicals and minerals 
transformation industries, in which Africa could have an advantage due to its relative natural 
resources factor abundance. The effects go so far as to reduce intra-regional trade in Sub-
Saharan Africa. These facts put into question the benefits of Chinese involvement on Africa 
(Giovannetti and Sanfilippo, 2016). 
We can observe a product-based trade pattern. China imports fuels and natural resources from 
Africa, and, in turn, China exports technology and manufactured goods. This is quite telling of 
these regions factor endowments. While China lacks natural resources and labour is abundant, 
Africa lacks skilled labour and capital. Therefore, trade patterns between the regions could be 
explained by the relative abundance of factor endowments using the Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
(Wang, 2007). The relative abundance of infrastructure in China also helps to bring down costs 
and obtain a comparative advantage over developing nation by forcing domestic costs down, 
allowing for cheaper products that are demanded in lower income countries at the expense of 
these countries’ manufacturing. Politics and institutions come to play an important role here, as 
Chinese infrastructures and industries are powered by domestic institutions. The role of 
institutions may obscure the role of comparative advantage to explain trade between the regions 
(Palley, 2008). 
Economies of scale also provide an explanation for China´s trade pattern with Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Chinese State heavy investment and the creation of Special Economic Zones have 
created mega cities that specialise in the production of both consumer goods, electronics and 
machinery up to be considered the World´s factory of said products. These SZEs have achieved 
such economies of scale that constitute a barrier to entry to the Chinese market for least 
developed countries, which allows China to have a trade advantage over African countries in 
Manufactured goods (Eisenman, 2012).  
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3.3. Foreign investment and Aid 
Chinese firms’ involvement in Africa stems from its involvement in the political support of non-
aligned, de-colonised countries since the mid-20th century. This support came in the form of 
military support and Aid. From the 1990s on, the increasing trade ties of both regions urged 
Chinese SOEs to act as investors and haulers for infrastructure and construction aid projects, 
with some of them turning afterwards into partially private companies which undertook export 
operations for the Chinese market. With these footholds, many small and medium private firms 
flocked to Africa (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009) 
According to data gathered by the John Hopkins University (Figures 3 and 4), Chinese outward 
FDI to Africa has steadily increased since the early 2000. Though it has remained under US 
levels, in 2013, coinciding with the official start of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese FDI 
has surpassed US levels, which started to undertake a considerable divestment in the African 
Continent. Chinese FDI on Africa between 2013 and 2017 has been mostly destined to 
construction and mining (roughly 25% each), followed by Financial facilitation and 
manufacturing.  
 
 
Figure 3- Johns-Hopkins University (2019). China-Africa Research Initiative. Data: Chinese and American FDI to 
Africa. 
Nevertheless, Chinese figures for FDI may be misleading due to Chinese financial institutions 
definition of the indicator, which provides no clear definition between project financing and 
FDI proper. Additionally, Chinese firms use of retained earnings and bank loans instead of 
equity and the lack of transparency may lead to an underestimation of actual controlling 
investments carried out by Chinese firms on Africa (Wang, 2007). 
Development assistance has reached impressive heights in Africa during the last two decades. 
Even though figures in Chinese investment in the past are hard to reach, estimates show that 
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Chinese development aid to Africa reached $5.7 billion by 2006, showing the largest growth 
rates among all Chinese aid destinations, with some 800 companies operating in Africa at the 
time. These money inflows have one very prominent source, the Chinese Export-Import Bank, 
better known as Exim. The bank has been found to finance the infrastructure projects needed 
for the extraction of energy and minerals from the region. This institution is also well known 
for extending debt on favourable terms to African governments and Chinese SOEs. (Bosshard, 
2007) 
However, the World Bank estimated that infrastructure investments reached up to $12.5 billion 
by 2006, much more than what was reported by Chinese authorities, 80% of which was 
concentrated on Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique, Sudan and Zimbabwe. These estimates also 
reveal that up to 40% of investments went to the energy sector and the rest was concentrated 
on different infrastructure projects. (Bosshard, 2007) 
Investment inflows into Africa come in mostly to exploit the increasing returns of getting first 
to extract resources. According to the African Development Bank as of 2018, Africa´s 
infrastructure demand amounts to about $150 billion per year, which would be directed to 
power, water and transport projects which would allow firms to thrive in the continent and 
achieve industrialization in order to end poverty. Then, the infrastructure needs of the African 
economies are not yet met. As Guilllon et al. (2018) point out, between 2000 and 2014 Chinese 
Overseas Development Aid went primarily to the economic infrastructure and services sector, 
which is linked to natural resources acquisition, and was allocated more frequently in countries 
with weaker institutions. While Chinese infrastructure aid has had mixed effects on Africa´s 
development, it has helped to the economic recovery of many African countries, but it must be 
stated that labour practices, local participation, debt sustainability and negative impacts on the 
environment by Chinese firms still represent an obstacle to development (Alves, 2013).  
4. TRADE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Trade Analysis Literature Review 
The growth of the Chinese economy and its bid to become a dominant power in global trade 
has inclined many trade economists to study the trade effects of Chinese policy on the different 
regions of the world. Most recently, the Belt and Road Initiative has sparked the interest of 
analysts and the academia, which has resulted in a rich trade analysis literature on the issue. As 
we will observe in the following paragraphs, most of the analysed articles use the Gravity model 
to study the determinants of trade flows between regions. On the next lines, we are going to 
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analyse the literature on the Global effects on trade of the BRI and follow with a review on 
literature of China-Africa trade engagement. 
4.1.1. China and Belt and Road Trade effects:  
This section reviews papers dealing with the impacts of both China and the Belt and Road 
Initiative in various regions of the world.  
Garcia-Herrero and Xu (2016) developed a Gravity model in order to measure the degree by 
which world economic integration and trade gains are achieved by programmes like the Belt and 
Road Initiative. They achieve this by controlling for the effects of transportation costs and 
tariffs. The model includes three different types of transportation costs, which are proxied with 
the distance between countries by sea, rail and air. In total, the model includes 16748 
observations of bilateral trade from 129 countries and uses Pseudo Poisson Maximum 
Likelihood estimator to carry out the regression, as it deals well with zero trade issues and 
provides a robust estimator in presence of heteroskedasticity. 
Garcia-Herrero and Xu simulate three different trade scenarios, namely, the reduction in 
transportation costs implied from Belt and Road Initiative estimates, the creation of a free trade 
area within Belt and Road countries and the combination of the previous two. The article shows 
that the European Union would gain trade in the three different scenarios, and that landlocked 
countries would benefit the most from a reduction in transportation costs, mainly from land 
transportation. The biggest losers would be countries outside of Europe and Asia, but these 
loses are close to the 0 per cent. This article is somewhat important among Belt and Road 
Initiative and Gravity model Literature, to state the effects of the different scenarios that the 
OBOR may entail, namely the modest increase in trade due to cost reductions (Passi, 2018; 
Pencea, 2016). 
 
Ramasamy et al. (2017) use the Enabling Trade Index variables in a Gravity model, rather than 
develop their own Dataset. The article focuses on the effects of improvements in the quality of 
both soft and hard infrastructures to measure their effect in the amount of exports between 
countries, besides the ¨typical¨ Gravity model variables, adding three interaction variables and 
fixed time effects. This model uses 70000 bilateral trade observations from 139 country pairs in 
a mixed effects of panel data estimation. The model shows that improvements in border 
administration and information produce modest increases in exports. 
Chu Ping Lol (2018) developed a gravity model that introduces an equilibrium condition with a 
demand function with time preferences on one side and the supply function with transportation 
costs to measure the trade generated between China and the EU through freight time reductions 
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due to the Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure improvements in Eurasia. The article 
concludes that additional trade of 8 to 32% might be expected between the regions, and predicts 
that land transportation might become the dominant transportation mode in the medium term. 
Choi et al. (2018) use a gravity model to compare the trade volumes originated by the Maritime 
and Inland silk and road respectively and to assess the state of several variables before and after 
the Belt and Road Initiative. Herrero and Xu (2016) were among the motivations of Hwan Choi 
et al. (2018), due to their findings about the impact of different forms of transportation on trade. 
Hwan Choi et al. (2018) find that GDP has a stronger effect on trade along the Maritime Silk 
Road than the Inland Silk Road. They also find that infrastructure has had a stronger effect on 
exports after the arrival of the Belt and Road Initiative. The author uses a Structural Gravity 
model to estimate the effects of the possible Free trade agreements that may arise from the Belt 
and Road initiative. 
Kohl (2018) uses a gravity model includes value-added trade flows instead of the more typical 
total trade flows, to measure the effect of the Belt and Road initiative on trade and welfare. The 
model uses a general equilibrium model, which includes countries outside the BRI in order to 
take into account spill over effects. Kohl is quite critic with the use of gross trade flows between 
countries. According to several studies (Johnson, 2014; Johnson and Noguera, 2012), this 
practice creates biases that do not take into account the bidirectional linkages of a country's 
value added, but Gravity model literature still relies largely on gross trade flows to the best of 
our knowledge. 
Shahriar et al. (2018) provides one of the first studies on the economic integration of China with 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region, which comprises Chinese Yunnan and Guanxi, Laos, 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, and home to more than 250 million people. To 
measure the degree of economic integration, Shahriar et al. (2018) use a gravity model that 
includes dynamic factor variables to avoid omitting important factors such as historical trade 
relations. However, the authors still face a limit on the number of variables they can include due 
to the unavailability of data or variable selection, which keeps key issues on trade out of the 
model. Despite this, their model states that China is integrated with the Greater Mekong 
Subregion countries through economic ties and bilateral agreements. 
Nguyen et al. (2015) attempted to assess the differences in the results of the gravity model by 
measuring the determinants of bilateral trade flows from Vietnam to 54 partners, which are 
grouped by income levels. The authors run two separate models. The first, which includes just 
time variant variables are run with fixed effects Ordinary Least Squares, and the second, which 
includes both time variant and time invariant variables, uses regular old OLS, as including fixed 
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effects would wipe out any effect of time fixed variables from the estimation. The authors 
conclude that Vietnam´s trade follows the Heckscher-Ohlin model with richer countries, while 
following Linder´s Hypothesis with lower income countries.  
4.1.2. China-Africa trade effects: 
This section concentrates on the review of papers that had dealt with the China-African trade 
effects. 
Hu and van Marrewijk (2013) developed a Gravity model, using Zero-inflated Poisson 
regression, to analyse the trade relations between China and Africa. They estimated the trade 
pattern between the regions during the last decades of the late 00´s in order to obtain, employing 
data from the next decade on the previous model to obtain a prediction that could be compared 
with actual data. They then include China´s Preferential Trade Policies to assess their impact on 
trade with Africa. They employ data on 28 African exporters and 181 worldwide importers 
through 21 years (accruing 105840 bilateral trade observations).  They conclude that China´s 
promotion of trade in Africa through FDI, aid and cooperation is working to increase bilateral 
trade. However, they also state that tariff exemptions may not have as big of an impact as 
expected. 
Johnston et al (2013) built a Gravity model consisting of 155 countries to assess the 
determinants behind the role of China as Africa´s biggest trade partner. Countries outside of 
Africa were included to avoid product biases, as Africa mostly exports oil and raw materials. 
The researchers found that the recognition of the One China Policy had positive effects on 
trade and that China under traded with resource-poor countries. They use Pseudo-Poison 
Maximum Likelihood to carry out the estimations, due to its benefits when dealing with 
heteroskedasticity. 
Giovannetti and San Filippo (2005) assess the possible flood of cheap imports from the EU and 
China into Africa, hurting local producers by being crowded out and unable to compete. 
 They provide with a Gravity model which uses both OLS and the Generalized Method of 
Moments to carry out the estimations. They have observed that annual increases in Chinese 
Exports to Africa correspond with decreases in African Exports, concentrated in sectors 
dominated by China (textiles, clothing, machinery or equipment) and a decrease in intra-regional 
trade, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, and consequently, they validate their hypotheses that 
Chinese exports crowd-out African Exports. 
García-Herrero and Fung (2012) provide an analysis of FDI outflows from China and India to 
African countries. Through the use of Gravity model which runs weighted least squares and 
uses FDI outflows from each of these countries as a dependent variable. Besides the typical 
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gravity model variables (GDP, per capita GDP and Distance), they include quality of 
governance and public policy variables like the corruption, law and order or the capital control 
indexes of each target country. The authors conclude that Chinese investment is largely directed 
towards comparatively more corrupt countries with larger but poorer markets than India is. 
They explain this fact with the importance of Chinese SOEs as the major contributors to FDI 
outflows, which are involved in infrastructure projects in the region, often in exchange for oil 
or debt forgiveness, a practice more common in countries with comparatively worse rule of law.  
From this review of the literature it seems clear that the gravity model is the crucial method for 
the analysis of the BRI impact in several regions. Thus, the next section is devoted to present 
the gravity model´s theoretical foundations and introduce our own model. 
4.2. The Gravity Model:  
The Gravity Model was first used by Ravenstein (1885) to study migration flows between 
countries. Later in the 1960s, that the Gravity model started to become a tool to study 
international trade when Tinbergen (1962) used Newton´s Gravity equation to model trade 
flows between countries as a function of the sizes of their economies and the distance between 
them, that proxy existing trade costs. The Gravity Model started as a way to stylize trade between 
regions, merely as a metaphor, as it provides an intuitive explanation for a complex problem, 
which did not operate under any economic theoretical framework and remained out of 
mainstream economics until 1995 
After this phase, trade theorists and economists have developed an extensive body of literature 
behind the model, which has allowed to bring light to the dynamics of international trade but 
were still perceived as an analogy to physics. Some of the first theoretical approximations were 
laid out by Linnemann (1966), who used the gravity model in a complex partial equilibrium 
model with exports on the supply side and imports on the demand-side Later, many economists 
like Anderson (1979), who developed an economic approximation to the model assuming 
product differentiation by geographic origin and CES expenditures, or Bergstrand (1985), who 
used the model in a Hecksher-Ohlin framework, defined further theoretical foundations of the 
gravity model on empirical grounds, but were too complex to become part of economists´ 
analysis toolkits.  
While globalization was making the press and the general public feel that borders were no longer 
of use in the 1990s, McCallum (1995) developed a gravity model which refuted that notion. His 
piece showcased the entry of the Gravity model into mainstream economics due to the 
usefulness of his model to predict the outcomes of trade policies. Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2001) state the importance of including multilateral resistance terms into gravity equations, as 
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omitted variables can overestimate the negative effect of borders on trade (Head and Mayer, 
2014). The Gravity model is now a standard procedure and a widely used model which, 
according to Yotov et al. (2016), is able to consistently provide a fit of between 60 and 90% of 
trade flows for both aggregate and sectoral data. 
The most basic form of the gravity model is comprised of three variables that explain trade 
flows. Xij represents trade flows -either total trade, imports, exports-. Yi (Yj) represents a 
measure countries i and j´s economies (most usually GDP). These are Country or Region´s i 
and j´s GDP, (or other measures of economic size), and distance, a proxy for trade costs 
between target economies. βଵ and βଶ are expected to be greater than 0, while βଷ must be lower 
than 0 for the intuitions of the Gravity model to hold. The sign of these coefficients represents 
the proportional relation between the economies and trade flows and the inverse relation of 
distance with trade flows, respectively.  
 
Xij = β଴YiஒଵYjஒଶDijஒଷ     (1) 
 
The Gravity model can appear either as shown above, in its multiplicative form or in its 
logarithmic -linear form-, as shown below. The latter is the most widely used form of the Gravity 
model, according to the literature, even though Santos Silva and Teneyro (2006) point out that 
log-linearized forms of the Gravity equation can result in misleading conclusions.  
 
                              log൫X୧୨൯ =  α + βଵ log(Yi) + βଶlog(Yj) +  βଷlog൫D୧୨൯     (2) 
 
Expanded versions of the gravity model contain more variables in order to curb the omitted 
variable bias. Including just the previous variables to model trade flows may provide an over-
estimation of their coefficients and these variables could be correlated to the error term, leading 
to endogenous variables. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) introduced the concept of 
Multilateral resistance factors, which take into account trade flows are affected by trade between 
third parties. An expansion of the Gravity model could be the following: 
 
                                Xij = β଴YiஒଵYjஒଶDijஒଷLiஒସLjஒହAijஒ଺ε୧୨                                (3) 
 
 
 log൫X୧୨൯ =  α + βଵ log(Yi) + βଶlog(Yj) +  βଷlog൫D୧୨൯ + β4 log(L୧) +  β4 log൫L୎൯ +  β6 log൫A୧୨൯ + ε୧୨   (4)  
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In Equations 3 and 4 (the linearized form of equation 3), we have added variables for the 
population of countries i and j (Pi and Pj), which can affect trade flows -due to, for instance 
economies of scale or market potential- and a set of dummy variables in Bij, which usually 
control for the existence of trade barriers between countries or special characteristics which may 
affect the nature of trade flows. (Baier and Bergstand, 2009) 
We are going to follow the methodology used by the most updated versions of the Gravity 
model, which appear in Nguyen et al (2016), Shahriar (2018), as reviewed above. These works 
include as their variables: Population, trade openness and the bilateral exchange rate besides the 
traditional gravity model variables. However, we have decided to drop bilateral exchange rate 
from our model since we considered that Chinese FDI outflows into African countries would 
provide a better understanding of trade flows between the regions. Adding FDI flows in the 
model as an explanatory variable has been previously used by Fonaigné and Pajot (1997). Even 
though Sheperd (2016) recommends adding both in and outside flows when adding bilateral 
variables, data on African outgoing FDI has been almost impossible to gather for all the 
countries in our model. To take into account past trade relations we introduce a lagged export 
variable, used by Greene (2008) and Irwin et al. (1998). The model also includes five dummy 
variables, Petrol Exporter, Transport Investment, Mining Investment, Landlocked and BRI 
Member, which aim to measure the effect of the Belt and Road in the model, as well as specific 
country characteristics. Similar use of dummy variables is used in the models in which we are 
taking inspiration for our study.  
The following equation follows from our decisions:  
 
log൫Exports୧୨൯ = α + βଵ log(GDPi) + βଶlog(GDPj) + βଷlog൫pcGDPI୨൯ + βସlog൫pcGDPI୨൯ + βହ log(AdpcGDPij) + 
                              +β଺ log(Opennessj) + β଻ log൫Pop୨൯ + β଼ log൫FDI୧୨൯ +βଽ log൫Distcap୧୨൯ + βଵ଴ log൫BRI୨൯        (5) 
                             +βଵଵ log൫PetrolExporter୨൯ + βଵଶ log൫Landlocked୨൯ + βଵଷ log൫exports୧୨,୲ିଵ൯ +
                                     βଵସ log(Transport) + βଵହ(Extraction) + ε୧୨,୲                       
 
Nguyen et al. (2016) subdivide equation 5 into three separate models in order to avoid inaccurate 
estimations and overfitting the model. Each different model shares the same variables but the 
economic size variables. Following this logic, Model I (6) contains the GDP variables, Model II 
(7) contains the per capita GDP variables, and Model III (8) contains the absolute difference in 
per capita GDP.  
 
Model I:                                                                                                                      (6) 
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log൫Exports୧୨൯ =  α + βଵ log(GDPi) + βଶlog(GDPj) + βଷ log൫Pop୨൯ +  βସ log(Opennessj) + βହ log൫Pop୨൯ +
β଺ log൫FDI୧୨൯ + β଻ log൫Distcap୧୨൯ + β଼ BRIij + βଽ Petrolij + βଵ଴Landlocked + βଵଵTransport+βଵଶExtraction +
 βଵଷ log൫exports୧୨,୲ିଵ൯ + ε୧୨  
 
Model II:                                                                                                                 (7) 
log൫Exports୧୨൯ =  α + βଵ log(pcGDPi) + βଶlog(pcGDPj) + βଷ log൫Pop୨൯ + βସ log(Opennessj) + βହ log൫Pop୨൯ +
β଺ log൫FDI୧୨൯ + β଻ log൫Distcap୧୨൯ + β଼ BRIij + βଽ Petrolij + βଵ଴Landlocked + βଵଵTransport+βଵଶExtraction +
 βଵଷ log൫exports୧୨,୲ିଵ൯ + ε୧୨  
 
Model III:                                                                                                                (8) 
log൫Exports୧୨൯ =  α + βସlog൫AdpcGDP୧୨൯ + βଷlog൫Pop୨൯ + βସ log(Opennessj) + βହ log൫Pop୨൯ + log൫FDI୧୨൯ +
 β଺ log൫Distcap୧୨൯ + β଻ BRIij + β଼ Petrolij + βଽLandlocked + log൫exports୧୨,୲ିଵ൯ + βଵଵTransport + βଵଶExtraction +
ε୧୨  
4.3.  Sample and data 
The data sample used in our exercise covers the economic relations of eight African countries 
with China from the year 2000 to 2017. These specific countries -Angola, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia- have been drawn from an intensive 
research carried out by the McKinsey institute carried out between 2016 and 2017 (Jarayam et 
al. 2017). This study aimed to uncover the business activity and investment linkages that were 
happening in Africa, due to the obscurity of existing data on Chinese business labour use, 
management, size or financing. 
Although the country sample is small, there is strong variability among them due to their 
different levels of strategic relations to China. For one, robust partners, like Ethiopia and South 
Africa have aligned their development strategies with Chinese international projects like the Belt 
and Road Initiative and there are plenty Chinese firms in the different sectors of their 
economies. Others, like, Kenya, Nigeria or Tanzania have ample presence of Chinese businesses 
on their economies but their economic engagement results from a passive approach, that is, 
China recognizes these countries´ market potential. Angola´s relationship with China is mostly 
explained by Angolan oil exports in exchange for infrastructure investment. Zambia on the 
other hand is a recipient of Chinese private sector investment, which has reportedly resulted in 
a looming debt crisis (The Economist, 2018). Finally, Ivory Coast is the least engaged of the 8 
countries, with few Chinese investors and businesses.  
We also decided to include 8 additional countries to increase the size of our sample so that we 
better capture the determinants of trade between the regions. We gathered data on Botswana, 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Mozambique, Gabon, Namibia and 
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Zimbabwe. We chose these countries on the basis of data availability, since we aim to build a 
balanced data panel. 
4.4. Why panel data 
Panel data has many advantages over cross-sectional data. Both kinds of data are widely used in 
the estimation of Gravity Model, though the use of panel data has grown in importance during 
the last 30 years. Panel data usually has more degrees of freedom than cross-sectional or time 
series, leading to more efficient estimates and it deals better with heterogeneity than cross-
sectional data. Panel data is also able to capture more complexity than other series, as panel data 
covers several individuals over a defined period of time (T>1, N>1), while cross sectional data 
can only cover one period (T=1) and time-series can cover just one individual (N=1). It has also 
been proven that, under certain circumstances, computations and inferences are simpler (Hsiao, 
2007). 
4.5. Variables and data sources 
Figure 6 provides a brief summary of the variables included in our model, including the mean, 
minimum and maximum value and number of observations. Additionally, we have added an 
appendix to our work containing the gravity model panel dataset, which will be uploaded 
alongside our study. 
Our Gravity model contains the variables of its most basic form. That comprises economic size, 
income and distance. GDP i and j represents the Gross Domestic Product of country i(j) in 
millions of US dollars at current prices. PcGDP i(j) is the per Capita Gross Domestic product 
pf Country i(j), also expressed at current prices in millions of US Dollars have been obtained 
through UNCTAD. Exportsij, that is, exports from China (i) to partner country (j) have been 
obtained from the IMF Direction of trade statistics database.  
The lagged export variable aims to represent the influence of previous trade flows on the 
current, making any results conditional on the countries´ past trade relations (Greene, 2008). 
According to Irwin (1998), omitting past trade relations on a Gravity Model can result in omitted 
variable bias showing up in our estimations.  
FDIout has been obtained from the Africa-China research initiative -developed by the Johns 
Hopkins University-, a database that also contains information on loans, agricultural 
investments, construction, workforce and aid carried out by China on African territory from 
2000 to 2017. FDI data provided by the China Research Initiative comes from the China 
Statistical Yearbook and the Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
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and covers the years 2003 through 2017, as Chinese FDI was recorded according to a different 
definition in the previous Chinese statistical yearbooks, which covered data up to 2005, and 
hence, both pieces of data are not consistent. To overcome the missing values, we have taken 
the median value of every country for the years 2000 to 2002. 
The Distance variable has been obtained from CEPII´s GeoDist distance database, which 
contains data on several measures of distance between all the countries in the world, which is 
valid for country pairs. Distance is a time fixed variable, which measures the distance between 
the capital cities of China and its trade partners covered in the sample 
Landlocked, which gives a value of 1 if a country is landlocked and 0 when a county is not, is a 
time fixed dummy variable has too been obtained from CEPII´s GeoDist geographic database. 
This database contains information about several geographic variables like common language 
or common colonizers for 225 countries around the world. 
Petrol Exporter equals 1 when country j exports oil raw products to China. The variable has 
been developed by the authors by observing which sample countries exported Petroleum during 
the period we cover and has been retrieved from UNCTAD. 
BRI is a dummy variable that equals 1 when country j was engaged in China´s Belt and Road 
Initiative and 0 for the opposite. All countries received BRI investments from 2013 to 2017, as 
reported in the Global Chinese Investment Tracker database. This database provides 
disaggregated data on 3100 transactions of Chinese investments by sector, country and year. It 
also attempts to pinpoint the sources of investments, that is, whether they come from Chinese 
banks, SOEs or the private sector and whether or not these investments belong to larger 
programs like the Belt and Road Initiative.  
The Global Chinese Investment tracker also includes the sector to which BRI investments are 
directed towards. We initially wanted to include the flow of Chinese investments to African 
countries 2000 through 2017. However, there were too many missing values and many countries 
did not receive any investment over the period. Instead we decided to include of 2 additional 
dummy variables, both of which account for whether a country received BRI investments 
related to the Transport and Minerals and Metals sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Figure 6: Data Description. Author´s calculations 
  Min. Max. Mean 
Exportsij 4,703 16832,7170 1629,6516 
GDPi 1211331,2 12237781,8 5708455,306 
GDPj 2914,926 568498,7882 56344,3579 
pcGDPi 943,9932 8682,24956 4157,9705 
pcGDPj 109,0972 10716,2241 2286,6983 
AdPCGDP 21,92385 8255,8114 2833,4613 
popj 1231,122 190886,311 34976,4714 
Opennessj 0,6800 141,5569 44,9893 
FDIout 0,0019 1440,8467 95,3979 
Distance 8315,988 12372,95 10961,1117 
LandLocked 0 1 0,25 
BRI 0 1 0,4375 
PetrolExp 0 1 0,5 
Transport 7 1 0,5625 
Metals  0 1 0,375 
N. of observations per variables: 288  
N. of Countries: 16   
N. of observations per country: 18  
Source:  Author´s own calculations  
5. RESULTS  
5.1. Expected results  
The Gravity model works according to a set of theoretical foundations, which have been 
explained above. Empirical Gravity models, then, must show a set of results so that they are 
consistent with their fundamentals and with the literature. We are going to point out the 
expected results to be obtained from our regression and divide them into time-variant and time-
fixed variables.  
- Time-variant variables: 
According to the basic assumptions of the gravity model both GDP and GDP per capita, that 
is, the size of an economy are expected to show positive effects on the amount of trade between 
two countries. The effect of the difference in income between two countries may have 
ambiguous effects. For one, if the Heckscher-Ohlin model holds, income disparities may have 
positive effects on the amount of trade. Conversely, if the Linder Hypothesis holds, the more 
similar two countries are, that is, if the difference in income is lower, the more trade will happen 
between both countries, showing a negative sign. 
The lagged export variable, which represents the trade history between countries, is expected to 
have positive effects on trade. The more two countries have traded in the past, the mote trade 
will happen between them. The lagged export variable aims to represent the influence of 
previous trade flows on the current, making any results conditional on the countries´ past trade 
24 
 
relations (Greene, 2008). According to Irwin (1998), omitting past trade relations on a Gravity 
Model can result in biased estimations.  
Trade openness in African countries is expected to have a positive sign, as the more important 
trade flows are to GDP in a country, the more it is expected to trade. The more a country´s 
economic size is explained by trade flows, the more it is expected to trade 
Population can have either a positive or a negative sign depending on whether the importer 
countries trades less when their populations are bigger, due to the absorption effect- or more, 
whenever the economy benefits form economies of scale (Martínez-Zarzoso and Novak-
Lehman, 2001) 
According to Fonaigné and Pajot (1997) outward FDI can either reduce or increase exports to 
the receiving country. Chinese investments on African countries can create a trade imbalance 
with China -i.e. China exports more to target country- due to the improved competitiveness of 
the investors. Conversely, investments can follow a “relocation” strategy, where the aim is for 
the investing country to increase their imports from abroad, having a negative effect on the 
investing country´s exports. 
- Time-Fixed Variables:  
The distance between countries is expected to have a negative effect on trade. This has been 
some of the most solid results in international economics. As we have previously mentioned, 
McCallum (1995), through a Gravity model, was able to state that borders and distance had a 
negative effect on trade, giving the Gravity model some of its current academic recognition as 
a method to explain trade flows.  
The BRI dummy variable is expected to have a positive effect on Chinese outward trade. This 
may happen for two reasons. For one, the reduced trade costs linked with the program´s 
investments on transport and infrastructure are expected to increase Chinese trade with its 
partners. Additionally, as previously mentioned, one motives behind the Belt and Road Initiative 
is to ease its overcapacity by expanding into new markets and, thus, increasing exports to the 
rest of the World. Transport is expected to have a positive though small, as Egger et al. (2007) 
found with their own Gravity model. Since minerals and metals´ extraction are so essential to 
African economies, comprising most of their exports, improved extraction capabilities via 
investments is expected to increase bilateral trade flows. Since Minerals and Metals are essential 
to understand Chinese trade flows with Africa, we expect a positive sign on this variable. The 
dummy variable for Petroleum exports to China is expected to have a positive effect on trade, 
since we have found petrol to be the most important exports of the region to China, which 
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China receives in exchange of consumer and capital goods. The control of oil sources in Africa 
appears to be a driving force behind Chinese foreign and trade policy. 
Finally, landlocked countries are expected to trade less with the exterior, since most of today´s 
trade is carried out by water and they rely on land, and marginally air, infrastructure. The 
situation of Landlocked countries is especially dire in Africa, where the lack of land 
infrastructure, trade and economic growth (García-Herrero and Xu, 2016). 
5.2. Unit roots test: 
In order to properly estimate the proposed equations, we need to ascertain whether our panel 
data has unit roots or not. To determine the presence of panel unit roots we have to test every 
time dependent variable for stationarity. If there is no panel unit root, we will be able to use 
standard estimation techniques. If not, we will test our models for cointegration. 
We have decided to use the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) panel unit roots test, as it is the method used 
by Shahriar (2016) and is widely used in panel root models. This method, “tests the null 
hypotheses that each time- series has a unit root, against the alternative hypothesis that each 
time series is stationary”. The method works under the assumption that there is independence 
across individuals and assumes common cross-country auto-regressive parameters. (Levin et al., 
2002).  We are going to apply the LLC test both at Level and at First difference series for each 
variable. If a variable has a Unit root at Level, we will transform the variable with first differences 
to make it stationary. Then, if all variables have no unit root, the Null Hypothesis of LLC will 
be rejected, and we´ll be able to use standard estimation methods.  
As observed in Figure 7, at Level, Exportsij, GDPj, pcGDPj, AdpcGDP, FDIout Popj and 
Opennessj are found to be stationary at less than 1% significance level. At First Differences, 
Exportsij (-1), GDPi, pcGDPi, popi, and Opennessi are found to be stationary. Since all our 
variables have no unit root, we reject the Null Hypothesis of the LLC test and conclude that 
there is no panel unit root.  
Figure 7:  Levin-Lin-Chu Test 
    Level   1st-Difference 
Variable LLC p-value LLC p-value 
Exportsij -5,7269*** 0,0000 -4,2797*** 0,0000 
Exportsij(-1) 5,7251 1,0000 -17,4765*** 0,0000 
GDPi 7,2603 1,0000 -5,79736*** 0,0000 
GDPj -3,1414*** 0,0008 -8,69727*** 0,0000 
pcGDPi 5,6214 1,0000 -5,6850*** 0,0000 
pcGDPj -2,7140*** 0,0033 -8,66416*** 0,0000 
AdPCGDP -5,4399*** 0,0049 -7,57469*** 0,0000 
popj -11,3533*** 0,0000 -9,98469*** 0,0000 
Opennessj -5,2032*** 0,0000 0,0436 0,5174 
FDIout -2,1654*** 0,0152 -4,8554*** 0,0000 
  *,**,*** indicates significant LLC test at 10%, 5% and 1% 
Source: Author´s own calculations 
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5.3. Fixed effects vs Random Effects: The Hausman Test 
We have carried out a panel analysis to estimate the determinants of trade between China and 
the chosen African countries with EViews 10. Following Shahriar (2018), we are going to use 
either Random or Fixed effects Ordinary Least Squares estimation to obtain an estimation of 
the isolated effects of Time-variant variables, a short-term model so to speak. Then, we are 
going to follow with Panel Least Squares estimation on Models I through III, which takes into 
account long-term fixes variables like whether a country is landlocked or the distance between 
countries. To assess which one of them we are using, we will perform the Hausman test on the 
Random effect’s regression of Time-Variant variables. Fixed effects estimators are consistent 
and are a good answer to endogeneity issues, besides, the effects of time-fixed variables are 
controlled with time-variant variables.  Random effects estimators are more efficient, but 
consider unobserved variables to be uncorrelated with observed variables, which can sometimes 
be wrong, (Williams, 2018). The Hausman test is then used to solve this problem, as it detects 
endogenous variables in a model, that is, when they are correlated with the error term. The null 
hypothesis states that the Random effects model is preferred and the covariance between 
variables and the error term is cero. With the alternative hypothesis, the fixed effects model is 
preferred since variables are correlated with the error term and there is endogeneity. 
(Chmelarova, 2007). 
 Our results for the Hausman test, laid out in Figure 8 report that the null hypothesis is rejected 
at less than 1% level of significance for all three models, which implies that the covariance 
between the regressors and the error term is different from cero, signalling the presence of 
endogeneity in our model. Therefore, in order to obtain consistent estimators, we are going to 
use the fixed effects estimates in our model, as its estimates are consistent even in presence of 
endogeneity. 
Figure 8: Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects; Hausman Test. 
   Model I     
 Fixed Effects   Random Effects   
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
C -98,7456*** 0,0000 -139,8386*** 0.0000 
Exportsij (-1) * 0,2558*** 0,0000 0,2762*** 0.0000 
GDPi* 2,8689*** 0,0000 2,0558*** 0.0000 
GDPj 0,4624*** 0,0002 0,8173*** 0.0000 
pcGDPi*     
pcGDPj     
AdpcGDP     
Openness 0,0001*** 0,0000 0,0002*** 0,0000 
FDIout 0,0019*** 0,8507 -0,002353 0,823 
Popj 4,4625*** 0,0000 0,294077*** 0,0007 
R2   0.9658   0,9135 
   Chi2 p-value 
Hausman Test     35,2666*** 0,0000 
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Model II         
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
C -99,8956*** 0.0000 -142,08*** 0,0000 
Exportsij (-1) * 0,2560*** 0.0000 0,2764*** 0,0000 
GDPi*     
GDPj     
pcGDPi* 2,8625*** 0.0000 2,0522*** 0,0000 
pcGDPj 0,4647*** 0.0001 0,8182*** 0,0000 
AdpcGDP     
Openness 0,0001*** 0,0000 0.0002*** 0,0000 
FDIout 0,001902 0,8573 -0.0024 0,8185 
Popj 4,9186*** 0,0000 1,1116*** 0,0000 
R2   0,9658   0,9134 
   Chi2 p-value 
Hausman Test     35,1593*** 0,0000 
Model III         
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
C -106,2541*** 0,0000 -181,0933*** 0,0000 
Exportsij (-1) * 0.3448*** 0,0000 0,3546*** 0,0000 
GDPi*     
GDPj     
pcGDPi*     
pcGDPj     
AdpcGDP -0.0123 0,7376 0,0536 0,1051 
Openness 0.0001*** 0,0000 0,0002*** 0,0000 
FDIout -0.0252** 0,0453 -0,0269** 0,0318 
Popj 5,3817*** 0,0000 0,7508*** 0,0000 
R2   0,9477   0,8574 
   Chi2 p-value 
Hausman Test     52,0887*** 0,0000 
* represents First Different    
Note: *, **, *** on coefficient represents 10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance 
Source: Author´s own calculations 
5.4. Regression 
Our models provide a good measure of fit to the real data. As we can see in Figure 9, Models I 
and II explain 93.66% of Chinese exports to African Countries, while the adjusted R2 measure 
is very similar, which tells us that the independent variables that actually affect Chinese Exports 
explain 93% of both models. Model III provides a worse performance measure as the model 
explains 75.25% of trade flows, a fifth less than our first two models. If we resort to the F-
statistic test, all our three models´ p-values are statistically significant at less than 1%, which 
allows us to reject the null hypothesis that our model has no overall predictive capabilities, and 
thus results have not happened by chance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Panel Regression Results 
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We are going to start the analysis of our results with the cornerstone variables of the Gravity 
Model, that is, all five economic size variables, and distance, which results are reported in Figure 
8. The economic size variables in Models I and II, GDPi,j and pcGDPi,j are all significant at 
less than 1% and have a positive effect on Chinese Exports to Africa, as expected. For Chinese 
GDP and pcGDP, a 1% increase leads to a 1.7% increase in exports. The African counterpart 
is less than proportionate, as a 1% increase leads to about a 0.93% increase in Chinese exports. 
The effect of the difference in Incomes between regions (Model III) was predicted to be 
ambiguous, depending on whether the H-O model or Linder´s Hypothesis is more prevalent. 
The variable is statistically significant at less than 5% significance level and has a negative impact 
on Chinese exports to Africa, as a 1% increase in income difference leads to a 0.12% decrease 
in exports, which is a weak effect. This result implies that, in this case, Linder´s Hypothesis is 
more prevalent, as the two regions trade less when their economic sizes tend to a wider 
difference. Finally, distance shows a strong negative effect on exports in Models I and II, with 
a percent increase in distance lowering Exports by 2%, being both statistically significant at less 
than 1%. Nevertheless, in Model III, distance has a much lower negative effect on trade which 
is not statistically significant. 
Chinese Outward FDI has not been as powerful as we had expected. It is not statistically 
significant in models I and II in either the short-run or the long-run, but it is in models III, with 
a negative effect of 0.08% by an additional 1% FDI flow. As the Johns-Hopkins University´s 
China Research Initiative stated, Chinese outward FDI figures may not represent the true 
   Model I   Model II Model III  
Variables Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
C -126,3969*** 0.0000 -129,0762*** 0.0000 -202,0191*** 0.0000 
EXPORTSij(-1)* 0,2813*** 0.0000 0,2814*** 0.0000 0,262829** 0,0218 
GDPi* 1,7319*** 0.0004     
GDPj 0.9326*** 0.0000     
pcGDPi*   1,7306*** 0,0005   
pcGDPj   0,9326*** 0.0000   
AdpcGDP     -0,1246** 0,0464 
OPENNESSj 0,0002*** 0.0000 0,0002*** 0.0000 0,0003*** 0.0000 
FDIOUT -0,0173 0.2030 -0,0173 0,2020 -0,0822*** 0,0015 
POPj -0,0335 0.4495 0,8991*** 0.0000 0,5504*** 0.0000 
DistCap -2,1910*** 0.0000 -2,1908*** 0.0000 -0,839314 0,3047 
Transport 0,2089*** 0.0000 0,2089*** 0.0000 0,11843 0,1516 
PetrolExp 0,1689*** 0.0000 0,1689*** 0.0000 0,1779*** 0,0036 
Landlocked -0,0990** 0.0135 -0,0989** 0,0136 -0,2131*** 0,0068 
Bri Member 0,1401*** 0.0000 0,1401*** 0.0000 0,2776*** 0.0000 
Metals 0,2572*** 0.0000 0,2572*** 0.0000 0,1119 0,1036 
R2  0,9366  0,9366  0,7525 
Adjusted r2 0,9333  0,9333  0,7408 
 F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value 
 28,42775*** 0.0000 28,42025*** 0.0000 64,12173*** 0.0000 
Source: Author´s own calculations 
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picture, as the amount of Chinese companies setting shop in the last two decades have been 
increasing.  
The trade history variable has had, as expected, a positive and statistically significant effect, 
increasing Chinese exports to Africa by 0.3% with stronger past trade flows. This result goes in 
line with the work Greene (2018) and Irwin (1998), as the lagged trade variable helps explain 
the determinants of trade flows.  
African countries’ trade openness appears to be statistically significant across the three models, 
but its effect on Chinese exports to Africa is negligible, as a percent increase in African trade 
openness translates into an almost 0% percent increase in Exports. This result could derive 
from the fact that most of these economies rely on resource or raw materials’ exports at a similar 
level. Since the most of the countries considered had a similar level of openness to trade, safe 
for Nigeria and South Africa, its effect on trade flows might not show as powerful as others 
despite being in important factor. 
African population is statistically significant in Models I and II, showing positive but less than 
proportionate effects on Chinese exports to the area. The positive sign implies that economies 
of scale shape China’s exports to Africa, that is, the more populous a country is, the more 
exports are directed to it to benefit from a larger market size. As we observed in the first chapters 
of this work, most of Chinese exports to Africa come in the form of consumer goods, with 
intermediate and capital goods following closely. It makes sense then that the larger the 
population, the more needs Chinese products can serve. However, we have observed that 
population has increases trade by a 5% with a 1% increase in population in the short-run model, 
much more powerful than the long run model. The fact that the second model includes distance, 
may be the reason for this change, since some of the trade that was happening because of 
population alone, has been countered with the negative effect of distance and has been 
disseminated in the remaining fixed variables and the errors.  
Being a BRI member has had a positive effect on trade. This affected bilateral trade flows by an 
increase of 0.14% in models I and II and 0.26% in model III, being statistically significant across 
all models. This tells us that Chinese policy is achieving its objectives, trading more for instance, 
though more time is needed to observe the longer-term effect of the BRI.  
Oil exporting countries have been proven to receive more Chinese Exports by about a 0.2% 
more than those who are not, being statistically significant at less than 5% in all three models.  
This result confirms our intuition since oil is one of the cornerstones of trade flows between 
African Countries and China. Additionally, countries that received Chinese investments to the 
minerals and metals´ extraction sector also tend to trade more with China, up to a 0.25% more. 
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Countries that received transport infrastructure investments, most of them linked to the BRI, 
also tend to trade more with China. Finally, being a landlocked country had a negative effect on 
trade, with locked countries trading up to a 0.2% less with China.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Our work aimed to achieve an understanding of the main factors that explain Chinese 
relationship with Africa. In our model, we chose a sample of 16 African sub-Saharan countries 
trading with China, in which the main projects of the Belt and Road Initiative were happening 
and their neighbours and we analysed how the Belt and Road Initiative might have an effect on 
trade between the regions.  
Our model has behaved as expected by its theoretical backgrounds, laid previously. Bigger 
economies, like Nigeria or South Africa tend to trade more with China, and the wider the income 
gap between China and Africa the less trade happens. The main intuition from the gravity model 
also holds, since distance has a very significant negative effect on trade. The Belt and Road 
Initiative aims to reduce this negative effect, since improving transport infrastructure brings 
countries closer. However, as Garcia-Herrero et al. (2016) point out that most of the 
improvements on infrastructure can be done in land infrastructure. From this, we can expect 
that land BRI projects on Africa will have a positive effect on inter-African trade. Countries 
receiving BRI investments on transport or metals and minerals sectors traded more with China 
than those who did not, which comes to show how the BRI is working towards increasing large-
scale integration, and how Africa is becoming more relevant in the international economy.  
Projected BRI related investments may contribute in closing the infrastructure gap, since the 
35% of Sub-Saharan African population does not have access to electricity and 51% does not 
have access to water (World Bank, 2017). Since local governments do not devote enough 
resources to this end, the BRI energy related infrastructure investments could help closing this 
gap. However, these projects are taken by countries through loans to Chinese institutions, which 
have raised concerns over developing nations´ debt sustainability and the possibility that the 
Chinese government may use this to obtain political leverage and control over these countries. 
Overall, the effects of the BRI on African development are ambiguous. We have also proven 
that petrol is an essential part of Chinese trade with African countries. Our results confirm that 
those countries which export crude oil or derivatives to China receive more Chinese exports 
than those which do not. The same applies to countries receiving investments to the transport 
and mining sectors. Africa has become one of the main suppliers for the Chinese demand of 
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natural resources. The lack of infrastructure in Africa has allowed Chinese contractors and 
policy makers to step in and gain an edge in obtaining these resources on a larger scale than 
current operations.  As we noted in the first chapter of this work, projects like the Tan-Zam 
Line or the Lobito-Luau line, both of which want to link coastal areas with the mineral and 
resource rich sectors in the interior. 
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8. APPENDIX 
The Excel file containing the Gravity model panel database will be uploaded alongside the 
TFG documents in MiAulario. Due to formatting problems and its large size, we deemed it 
better to upload the database as an additional file.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
